Abstract. Factoring-based public-key cryptosystems have an overall complexity which is dominated by the key-production algorithm, which requires the generation of prime numbers. This is most inconvenient in settings where the key-generation is not an one-off process, e.g., for forwards secrecy. To this end, we extend the Goldwasser-Micali (GM) cryptosystem to a provably secure system, denoted SIS, where the generation of primes is bypassed. By developing on the correct choice of the parameters of SIS, we align SIS's security guarantees (i.e., resistance to factoring of moduli, etc.) to those of other well-known factoring-based cryptosystems. Taking into consideration different possibilities to implement the fundamental operations, we explicitly compare and contrast the asymptotic complexity of well-known public-key cryptosystems (e.g., GM and/or RSA) with that of SIS's. The latter shows that once we are ready to accept an increase in the size of the moduli, SIS offers a generally lower asymptotic complexity than, e.g., GM or even RSA.
Introduction
Setting. Several, widely used public-key cryptosystems have a setup phase where prime numbers are generated and/or primality tests are run. The computational complexity yielded by the generation of a prime number of length L is generally in O(L 4 ) and -if optimised-O ∼ (L 3 ), as we will detail next in this section. Such generations occur, for instance, in the case of RSA [21] and/or in the Goldwasser-Micali (GM) probabilistic cryptosystem [7] , as each of them defines its operation over Z * n , for n being a product of two, distinct large prime numbers generated therein.
Moreover, there exist settings in which the key-generation in asymmetric cryptosystems is not an one-off process, e.g., key agreement with forward secrecy [1], secure delegation protocols [18] , EKE password-based key exchange [3] , zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge without any setups, where a new commitment key is used at each session. Secure delegation protocols [18] are based on homomorphic public-key encryption schemes and in each of the runs of such a protocol, the keys need to be re-issued freshly. Hence, the asymptotic complexity of prime-generation for the homomorphic encryptions used therein [18] (e.g., GM, RSA, Paillier's encryption, etc.) becomes an alarming bottleneck of the delegated computation. The scheme that we propose in this paper is homomorphic and it is aimed at overcoming precisely the shortcoming of such bottlenecks. In this context, in our comparisons, we focus mostly on (homomorphic) schemes that are commonly used in these settings i.e., factoring-based ones, and do not compare with public-key cryptosystems different in nature. I.e., we do not refer to the McEliece cryptosystem [17] based on algebraic codes, which may indeed have faster key-generation procedures; neither do we relate to Diffie-Hellman cryptosystems (e.g., EC-based) for which primes are not key-specific. We are interested in systems where the security gravitates around problems related to primality, e.g., factoring of moduli. More precisely, we extend and compare with the Goldwasser-Micali (GM) cryptosystem [7] .
Comparisons at a Glance. The security of the RSA cryptosystem is based on the integer prime-factorisation problem (i.e., the RSA modulus n should be hard-to-factor). Thus, a fair security guarantee is to take the length L of the modulus n large enough to be considered practically hard-to-factor using, e.g., the general number field sieve (GNFS) factorisation algorithm [14] . Given the complexity of the latter factorisation for a number of the order 2 L and measuring its hardness in the order of 2 s (s is a security parameter), we conclude that a secure length L for the RSA-generated modulus is The GM cryptosystem is semantically secure under the assumption that the quadratic residuosity (QR) problem modulo a composite integer n is hard. The QR problem stipulates that, given this modulus n and a number x ∈ Z * n , when the Jacobi symbol [10] for x ∈ Z * n with respect to n is 1, it is difficult to determine whether x is a quadratic residue modulo n. If the prime-factorisation of n is known, then the QR problem is easy. In this context of complexity-analysis, it is to be mentioned that the Jacobi symbol [10] itself generally has quadratic complexity, as schoolbook multiplication is most often used within. We briefly recall the GM scheme somewhat more detailedly. In the key-generation algorithm, firstly two different (large) prime numbers p and q are independently generated and n = pq. Then, a non-residue x is found such that its Legendre symbol [10] with respect to p and q are equal to −1, i.e., x p = x q = −1, whereas the Jacobi symbol with respect to n is 1. The public key is defined by the pair (x, n), whereas the prime factors p and q are kept secret. To encrypt a bit b, an integer y is randomly picked from Z * n , i.e., y ← U Z * n , and its encryption is calculated as c = y 2 x b (mod N). To decrypt, the secret key (p, q) is used and it is to check whether the encrypted value c is a quadratic residue, i.e., to solve Contribution. In this paper, we endeavour in extending the GM scheme into a publickey scheme that bypasses prime-generation procedures. The GM scheme has the same aforementioned complexity bottlenecks. We show reduction in complexity, from the
